The vagaries of voice in the composing process by Williams, Denise Rochelle
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Theses Digitization Project John M. Pfau Library 
1989 
The vagaries of voice in the composing process 
Denise Rochelle Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project 
 Part of the Rhetoric and Composition Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Denise Rochelle, "The vagaries of voice in the composing process" (1989). Theses Digitization 
Project. 445. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/445 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
  
,,THE VAGARIES OF VOICE IN THE COMPOSING PROCESS
 
■ . V 
A Thesis
 
Presented to the
 
Faculty of
 
California State University,
 
San Bernardino
 
In Partial Fulfillment
 
of the Requirements for the Degree
 
Master of Art
 
;'ln
 
English Composition
 
■ by ■■ 
Denise Rochelle^V^Uiams
 
August 1989
 
THE VAGARIES OF VOICE IN THE COMPOSING PROCESS
A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino
by
Denise Rochelle Williams
August 1989
Approved by:
Rise Axelrod, Chair, English Date
Mar Doane
Kramer '
ABSTRACT
 
Often, in my years as a student and as a writer, I have
 
heard, and made references to the "voice" in a piece of literature
 
I've read or perhaps written. Yet, as common as its use is in
 
writing and literature classes, we all seem hard pressed to ex
 
plain precisely what wd're talking about. As Gary SedlaCek ex
 
plains in his article ''Voices,'' "voice is the most important
 
element in imaginative writing, the center of the creative
 
activity." Yet, I. Hashimoto feels that "because the whole notion
 
of 'voice' is sO mystical and abstract, the term 'voice' may have
 
become nothing more than a vague phrase conjured up by English
 
teachers to impress and motivate the oiasses to write more, confess
 
more, and be happy" ("Voice As Juice").
 
This thesis is an exploration of thenature of the quality
 
we call voice, within the framework of a model. I call this model
 
a "circumscription," and 1 use the model to help us more
 
specifically define voice within the context of the relationship
 
that readers and writers share in the reading and writing
 
experience. My intention is to waylay many of the vagaries and
 
misconceptions surrounding the idea of voice, and provide in their
 
stead a better understanding of the processes and relationships
 
involved in voice, that enhance our experiences as readers and as
 
writers.
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Chapter 1:
 
INTRODUCING THE VAGARIES OF VOICE
 
W. P. Kinsella writes in a recent New York Times Book Review,
 
that "It is often ssiid about fiction writing that voice is every
 
thing. And what a voice Lee Smith has chosen for 'Fair and Tender
 
Ladies,' her most ambitious and most fully realized novel to
 
date;" Kinsella is of course being complimentary. He thinks we
 
should read Smith's book, particularly because it exudes that
 
elusive quality called voice. Voice is good. Voice is what all
 
writers strive to achieve. Susan Dodd expresses a similar concept
 
of voice when she writes in the Fall 1985 issue of The Seattle
 
Review, about Submitting her"first opus: a novel" to a publisher
 
in New York. The publisher's reply to Dodd's work was
 
astonishing. Dodd writes, "The verdict was swift and harsh.
 
Devastating. And true: 'You haven't found your voice'" (79).
 
Dodd continues to explain that she still hasn't found a voice to
 
call her own. She is not alone. Such a quest for "voice" has
 
dumb-founded many writers, young and old, experienced and inex
 
perienced.
 
Critical essays on composition and creative writing theory
 
are fraught with references to writer's voice. But there exists a
 
striking ambivalence within the writing community as to what voice
 
 in writing actually is.
 
Peter Elbow, in his book IVriting with Power emphasizes that
 
the wi'iting that is most fun and rewarding to read is that which
 
somehow feels more 'real.' The writing which is more 'real' is
 
that which has a sense of perspnal voice (283). Elbow attempts to
 
explain voice by describing those writings which have voice and
 
those that lack it.
 
In describing those pieces that have voice, he says:
 
Sometimes it was a particular thought that had greater
 
conviction, sometimes it was a particular feeling - an
 
angry happy, sarcastic, or even self-pitying observation
 
that somehow rang truer than its surroundings. Sometimes
 
these passages with voice seemed good by other standards,
 
sometimes they were not good writing at all. Sometimes
 
they were bupsts of sincerity, but not always....It was
 
just that they seemed to jump out at me as though suddenly
 
the writer had switched to a fresh typewriter ribbon.
 
■ • • ■ ^ (283) 
In describing that wliich"has none" he says,
 
Writing with no voice is dead, mechanical, faceless. It
 
lacks any sound. Writing with no voice may be sa3dng
 
something true, important, or new; it may be logically
 
organized; it may even be a work of genius. But it is
 
though the words came through some kind of mixer rather
 
than being uttered by a person. (287)
 
For Peter Elbow and Susan Dodd, voice represents a quality in
 
writing; writing that has voice is better than that which doesn't.
 
This thesis, "The Vagaries of Voice in the Composing Process,"
 
will explore the nature of that quality. Where does it originate?
 
How does the experience of voice happen? Can the writer actually
 
"choose" voice as Mr. Kinsella suggests? Why do we call it voice
 
when no one is actually "speaking"? Ideally, such an exploration
 
would conclude with a cledn and concise definition for the quality
 
in writing that we call voice. But because we refer to voice as a
 
quality in this ihstance, reaching a specific definitio is parti
 
cularly precarious.
 
Robert Pirsig discusses this problem elqquently when he
 
writes, "Quality is a characteristic of thought and statement
 
that is recognized by a non-thinking process. Because definitions
 
are a product of rigid, formal thinking, qusility cannot be de
 
fined" (200). It seems that the recognition of voice is purely
 
idiosyncratic. Such recognition is based on subjective analysis.
 
That is, it is based on the thoughts and feelings of the observer
 
rather than the object under cbnsideratipn. The exploration of
 
voice seems hopeless.
 
Re^rdless of how hopeless such an exploration seems, we are
 
still faced with a dilemnm that needs some sense of resolution.
 
Publishers, critics, composition instructors and creative writing
 
instructors are being critical of some writing because it lacks
 
voice. Susan Dodd's novel was rejected because it lacked voice.
 
Now what does she do? How does she find it? Is voice something
 
that can be found (or created) sd all?
 
In an attempt to draw our attention to this dilemmh. Rise
 
Axelrod, in a speech given at the College Composition and Communi
 
cation Conference (March 1987), explained that bur use of voice in
 
reference to written material is actually a metaphor, and "some
 
times we take it quite literally and transfer to the written text
 
many of the qualities we associate with speech.,.such as the ideas
 
of presence and personalityy and the values of audibility and
 
authenticity" (1). Likewise, Gary Seldacek, in his article
 
"Voices," quotes the definition for voice from A Handbook of
 
Modern Rhetorical Terms (Linda Woodson, ed., NCTE, 1979) as "The
 
imagined sound of a writer's voice that readers encounter in every
 
written utterance and that leads them to judge their affinity
 
with, their sympathy for, or their distance from the writer" (48),
 
thus supporting Axelrod's contention that voice in writing is a
 
metaphor for the spoken word.
 
However, the metaphor is more complicated than our first
 
assumptions allow, Axelrod is essentially clearing the dust from
 
the dinosaur rib we are unearthing. The metaphor of voice has
 
multiple layers; voice is used in a variety of contexts. On one
 
level voice is sound, on another level voice is power.
 
In his article "Chapter and Verse," Stanley Plumly uses voice
 
in several of these contexts. In one example, he explains, "the
 
poet's voice, his way of presiding over his material...whether
 
[in] terms of those of a persona or one of a trinity of personal
 
pronouns, is inevitable. The question is never one of the fact of
 
a voice, but of the effective control or disclosure of that voice"
 
(21). In this instance, Plumly is using voice as a metaphor of
 
the first "layer." It is a simple metaphor, the voice in a poem is
 
equal to the sound of the poet's speaking voice. Any writing
 
sample will contain voice in this instance, no matter how "dead.
 
mechanical, [or] faceless." This is in direct contradiction with
 
the quality that Elbow attempts to distinguish in his discussion
 
about voice.
 
Later in the article Plumly says, ''[the poet's] voice pre
 
sides as a participant," and "the voice...pokes through con
 
sistently to qualify and comMeht...the voice itself becoines the
 
hero of the story" (28). What specific entity or quality coUld he
 
possibly be talking about in this instance? Voice has become
 
somathing different from the imagined sound of the poet's spoken
 
words. It seems now, that Plumly recognizes voice as an entity or
 
consciousness in its own right which is distinguishable and which
 
possesses volition. Plumly continues by explaining that "in free
 
verse...the voice is more available and therefore more vulnerable"
 
(25). Voice seems to have become a metaphor for the being or
 
essence behind one's spoken words.
 
Such references to voice contribute to our frustration and
 
confusion. In Plumly's article, voice is no longer simply an
 
element of writing, it has become a metaphysical quality. No
 
wonder references to or about voice are indefinite and vague. The
 
discussion about voice is a discussion in metaphysics.
 
However, if we look to demystify or clarify voice, not by
 
defining it, but by providing boundaries to what we might mean
 
when we speak of voice, perhaps voice as a quality of writing can
 
be made more manageable, less abstract. A common term in geometry
 
is circumscription, which means to draw a circle around a geo­
metric figure, touching the circle to the figure at as many points
 
as possible. While we may not be able to produce exact measure
 
ments (definitions), or an exact circle (we're talking meta
 
physics, not mathematics), perhaps we can provide a circumscrip
 
tion for voice as a power in writing. We can encircle it and give
 
it form. The aim of this discussion is to provide the points of
 
that circumscription. Perhaps in this way, we can responsibly use
 
the term voice in discussing written material.
 
This circumscription begins with the nature of the relationship
 
that the reader and writer share in the reading and writing
 
experience. The quality, voice, cannot happen outside the context
 
of this relationship. In the reading and writing experience, all
 
there is, is relationship. In this way, the idea of human rela
 
tionship is interwoven and, in a sense, provides the context for
 
the discussion of voice. It is the thin Une that encircles the
 
concept of voice, and which finally gives voice its form.
 
Peter Elbow, in Writing With Power explains that "the
 
essential act at the heart of writing is the act of giving" (his
 
emphasis, 20). There can be no writing without a reader, just as
 
there can be no gift without someone receiving it. This rela
 
tionship is reminiscent of the question, if a tree falls in the
 
forest and no one is there to hear, does the falling tree make any
 
noise? Theoretically speaking, if no one (including the writer as
 
reader) reads a written work, has any writing actually been done?
 
However, it goes beyond a tree falling and an ear hearing. In
 
reading and writing, there is intention. There is a person writ
 
ing with a purpose, and there is a person reading with a purpose
 
(even when the reader is the writer his or her self). So not only
 
is the concept of voice based within a relationship, it is predi
 
cated upon the notion of intention within that relationship.
 
Point one in voice's circumscription is intention.
 
Point two has to do with context. We often emphasize the
 
process in writing and reading, as opposed to a product or result,
 
yet we treat this process as an isolated event: isolated from the
 
sense of self in each participant, and isolated from the
 
assumptions, the predispositions, a writer and a reader might
 
bring to that process. Within the relationship where voice is
 
created, there are at least two types of participants (even though
 
these two may be the same individual who takes on the role of one
 
participant and then another). The predispositions of each parti
 
cipant will help determine whether or not voice is created and/or
 
recognized.
 
The best place to begin is with the obvious. A reader reads,
 
and a writer writes. Chapters Two and Three of this thesis will
 
examine phenomena surrounding the reading and writing experience.
 
Each of these involves more than putting words onto paper and
 
reading words on paper. Each is involved in a process of thinking
 
and acting, which provides the context for relationship.
 
To complicate the issue further, each participant in this
 
writing/reading scenario plays multiple roles. A writer reads or
 
listens, and a reader writes or speaks. In The Barbarian Within,
 
Walter Ong explains that "as he composes his thoughts in words, a
 
speaker or writer hears these words echoing within himself...as
 
though he were another person" (51). In an acceptable sense, the
 
writer listens, or reads, while composing. Within each writer
 
there exists a duality of experience. The writer might experience
 
a self to some degree as the one who formulates and expresses
 
ideas, but she will also experience "the shadow of a 'thou'" (Ong
 
52), or "other" within herself who experiences and evaluates what
 
has been written. Ong explains that this sense of other is
 
essential to the communicative act which writing represents. The
 
writer becomes part of, or "participates in the other to whom he
 
speaks, and it is this underljdng participation which makes
 
communication possible" (52).
 
Similarly, the reader also experiences an "other." There is
 
the imagined writer, who is a construct of what the reader knows
 
of the author, and the reader's own inner speaking which is
 
audible as the reader reads. As proponents of Reader Response
 
criticism are quick to explain, the reader actually creates the
 
text, and becomes an author as he/she reads. As Stanley Fish ex
 
plains in his essay"Literature in the Reader," "it is the exper
 
ience of an utterance... that is its meaning" (78). The ex
 
perience that creates meaning belongs to the reader.
 
The final point of the circumscription of voice is an
 
exploration of our (the reader's and writer's) relationship with
 
a
 
language. Since the relationship between a reader and writer is
 
constructed solely within language, understanding how we use and
 
conceive of language will be critical in examining the concept of
 
voice, which is created within this reader/Writer relationship.
 
The model for our circumscription of voice is more
 
easily pictured like this:
 
Context 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Intention 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Voice 
u 
h 
N»! 
Language 
Chapter 3 
Chapter Two, "The Writer Writing/Reading," will examine the
 
writer, who he or she conceives of him/herself to be, and what he
 
or she might contribute in generating the experience of voice.
 
Chapter Three, "The Reader Reading/Writing" will examine the
 
reader in the same fashion. Chapter Four is reserved for an
 
exploration of our relationship with language, and will address
 
the question of why we seek voice in written material, and how
 
such a power as voice is determined within the context of the
 
previous chapters' discussions about the reader and writer. All
 
this is an attempt to Waylay many of the vagaries and
 
misconceptions surrounding the idea of voice, and provide in their
 
stead a better understanding of the processes and relationships
 
involved in voice that enhance our experiences as readers and as
 
writers.
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Chapter 2:
 
THE WRITER WRITING/READING
 
We begin this exploration with the question, is there any
 
thing the writer can do to create voice? To answer this we must
 
examine the writing situation. This examination quickly evolves
 
into an exploration of the context of the writing situation for
 
the the writer. The moment we ask about the writing situation, we
 
must make assumptions about who the writer is, and what that
 
writer might bring to particular rhetorical contexts. In ex
 
ploring the generation of voice, we must ask questions about what
 
generates and where this generation evolves from. By assuming
 
voice is an actual occurence in writing we assume there is a
 
speaker from whom that voice emerges. (This assumption reveals
 
the logocentricity that Professor Axelrod referred to when she
 
talked about transferring the ideas of presence and personality to
 
the written text, and later in Chapter 4, we will exsunine how such
 
logic might be problematic for us.) We associate voice in writing
 
with a particular consciousness or presence.
 
There are various prompts for writing, (prompt as distinct
 
from purpose, which stays with the writer throughout the writing
 
process). The prompt is the initial impetus that sets the writer
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writing, that causes the writer to set pen to paper. It is the
 
experience of this prompt that immediately places the writer in
 
the Writing predicament.
 
For a situdent, the usual prompt is a class assignment. Often
 
writers use writing to help them think. Writers write to be pub
 
lished. Writers write to communicate. Some writers write for the
 
sheer beauty of words and rhythm. Poets often write in apprecia
 
tion of an event or thing that is thought-provoking or beautiful.
 
Regardless of the prompt for writing, most of the thinking that
 
occurs before setting pen to paper (or hand to keyboaird) surrounds
 
the topic to be discussed or presented. One of the first concerns
 
for a writer is often whether or not she has enough knowledge or
 
Skill to write about her topic, and then, how she is to present
 
her topic for a reader. In any rhetorical or artistic situation,
 
the writer is immediately thrown into the role of "giver" or
 
presenter. Without the writer putting words on paper, the rela
 
tionship between a reader and a writer can't happen. As Elbow
 
explains, "the essential human act at the heart of writing is the
 
act of giving'V (20).
 
Regardless of the rhetorical situation, the writer is in a
 
predicament when faced with a,blank page. The writer is "on the
 
line" so to speaks She must give something. There are
 
assumptions she will have about herself and her topic, and her
 
purpose for writing, that create the context in which she will be
 
writing; that determine her ability to give. Vulnerability is the
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tail side to the coin of ^ ying. It is this state of
 
vulnerability that teachers often refer to when they ask for
 
"honest" or "authentic" writing. William Coles demonstrates this
 
sort of dialogue in his book The Plural I. In speaking with a
 
student he says.
 
Now just tell it the way you'd tell it. Just use your
 
own voice, not a manner or a style you've borrowed, just
 
be you, something somebody couldn't imitate, or couldn't
 
imita.t6 easily. sCan ypu do that?
 
[The student] smiled, "I haven't been able to do it so
 
far." (41)
 
This situation is an immediate problem for a writer in the
 
academic environment, because more often th£in not, the writer is
 
being judged on her ability to give; she is being judged on her
 
skill as a Writer. When one is giving of oneself, as Elbow claims
 
all writing is, it is difficult to separate the self from that
 
which is given. The writing situation is threatening for the
 
student writer. When placed in the academic environment, often
 
students will lack the sense of autonomy that allows them to "take
 
full responsibility for [their] words" (Elbow 22).
 
Addressing the problems of the writer's autonomy or sense of
 
self as part of the context in which the writer will write, meets
 
additional problems when we start to consider just exactly who or
 
what that self reedly is. Joseph Harris, in his article "The
 
Plural Text/The Plural Self: Roland Barthes and Williams Coles"
 
writes,
 
Real eloquence is honest; the best pi>ose is the most
 
natural. The problem with such a view is that it reduces
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writing to a simple test of integrity; Either your guts
 
are out there on the page or they're not.... Seen this
 
way, the advice to be yourself starts to seem dogmatic,
 
bullying, for it assumes that writers already have a self
 
somewhere, ready-made, that they merely need to make their
 
prose reflect and express. (161)
 
Suddenly, it seems that the writer must first assume a role
 
or identity for herself before she can write and, in the context
 
of writing, become a vulnerable, giving person. While this sounds
 
like a difficult task, any writer actually does this whenever he
 
or she sits down to write. Out of a basic, subliminal reaction to
 
the writing predicament, the writer creates a self. This happens
 
in each instance of writing, from grocery lists to love letters,
 
from novels to a note left on a friend's car. And the nature of
 
this "writing" self is directly related to who the writer presumes
 
the reader to be. This self is dictated by the rhetorical situ
 
ation. By simply acknowledging an "other" (or reader, who may be
 
the writer herself), a writer creates a "non-other." The writer
 
creates a self.
 
In continuing the discussion of the nature of the writer's
 
self, William Coles contends that"writing is not simply a tool we
 
use to express a self we already have; it is the means by which we
 
form a self to express" (161). The process of writing is the
 
process of becoming. It would seem that voice might not neces
 
sarily result from a writer's "self" expression, but may be that
 
which creates a sense of self for the writer. Writers don't
 
create voice; voice (well crafted written language?) creates the
 
sense of a person who is the writer.
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But the question remains, what is the relationship of the
 
nature of this self, to whether or not voice occurs in the
 
writer's writing? As the nature of the writer's self is a criti
 
cal factor in creating the context in which the writing will
 
occur, the nature of this self may be critical in creating voice.
 
Sondra Perl's explorations in the nature of the composing
 
process might offer some insight into this question. She touches
 
upon the relationship the writer's self may have to voice with her
 
notion of ''felt sense.'' Perl conducts an experiment in which she
 
studies writers composing. From her observations she notes:
 
There seems to be a basic step in the process of
 
composing that skilled writers rely on even when they are
 
unaware of it...This [step] seems to rely on very careful
 
attention to one's inner reflections....When it's
 
working, this process allows us to say or write what we've
 
nevec said before, to create something new and fresh, and
 
occasionally it provides us with the experience of"new
 
ness" or "freshness," even when "old words" or images are
 
used. (366)
 
According to Perl, one's abiiity to"listen" to one's inner voice
 
is directly related to whether or not a writer is able to create
 
"freshness" and "newness even with old words. The quality of
 
this "inner voice" will be determined largely by who the writer
 
assumes herself to be. If the writer is unable to create herself
 
as knowledgeable or insightful, she will be unable to "hear"
 
knowledge or insight or "newness" (all, perhaps, elements of
 
voice). A writer's inability to "hear" may be critical in
 
understanding why a writer's writing results in "dead, mechanical,
 
faceless" prose (or poetry).
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So there are perhaps two factors that we can distinguish from
 
Perl's experiments that may be critical to the writer creating
 
voice (if the writer actually can create voice). The first re
 
lates to the writer's ability to create an identity that thinks in
 
an engaging, provocative manner; the second relates to the
 
writer's ability to "hear" and then transmit that new, provocative
 
"inner voice" to the page.
 
Earlier in this discussion about the writer's created self, I
 
mentioned that the nature of this self is directly correlated to
 
who the writer assumes the reader to be, and that by acknowledging
 
an"other," the writer creates a "non-other" or self. If the
 
nature of this self is a factor in considering how a writer
 
creates voice, thein possibly the writer's conception of the
 
"other," or reader, may play an equally important role.
 
In quoting The Notebooks^ Henry James in The Rhetoric of
 
Fiction. Wayne Booth says "as the young James had long before
 
said, what the author does is to 'make his reader very much as he
 
makes his characters...when he makes {the reader] well, that is,
 
makes him interested, then the reader does quite half the labor'"
 
xm. V j;,
 
Later Booth asserts that it is not possible to write without
 
the reader in mind.; Even an atithbr who claims to write "for
 
himself," can only do so "if he imagines himself temporaidly as
 
his own reader, approaching his work without special knowledge"
 
■(loa). ■ 
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In a sense, there are two readers in the rhetorical situa
 
tion. One is a living, breathing human being, "upon whose crossed
 
knee rests the open volume, and whose personality is as complex
 
and ultimately inexpressible as any dead poet's" (Gibson 266).
 
It is this reader that Richard Hugo cautions us about when he
 
:writes.
 
Never worry about the reader, what the reader
 
can understand. When you are writing, glance over your
 
shoulder, and you'll find there is no reader. Just you
 
and the page. Feel lonely? Good. (Triggering Town 5)
 
Booth, however, is talking about the second type of reader.
 
Walker Gibson calls this reader the "mock reader" ("Authors,
 
Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers"). Essentially, the mock
 
reader is the reader who is a construct of the writer's imagina
 
tion (and later, the reader's imagination as discussed in the
 
following chapter, "The Reader Reading/Writing"). It is this
 
reader that Henry James refers to when he talks about making the
 
reader well. It doesn't matter whether this individugil actually
 
exists, although in imagining this reader, the writer hopes to
 
come as close as possible to an actual person. What matters is
 
that the writer, in his or her own mind, has a partner with whom
 
to have the reading/writing relationship. How the writer
 
"creates" this partner, in his own imagination, may directly in
 
fluence the quality of the discourse the writer presents. So the
 
question we must address in examining voice is, how does the
 
writer "write" the reader well?
 
According to Jeunes, our ability to "make the reader" contri­
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butes tremendously to our ability to write "with intensity"
 
(Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction. 42). Probably one of the
 
biggest contributions a writer can make, in creating high quality
 
in the reader/writer relationship, is for the writer to create the
 
"mock reader" in as close an approximation as possible to the
 
actual reader, or to create that "mock reader" a person who the
 
actual reader would want to be.
 
Accomplishing such a phenomenal task as creating a "mock
 
reader" who is a close approximation of the actual reader who
 
might read our writing poses a huge problem for writers
 
(especially those who might take Hugo's advice on not considering
 
the reader when writing). It means that a writer must ultimately
 
be interested in others, or at least in the world around him. The
 
writer must know actual readers in order to create"mock readers"
 
well. In order to be interesting, the writer must be interested.
 
In Writing With Power. Peter Elbow touches upon the notion of
 
creating the reader well, when he tedks about "breathing
 
experience into words" (314). He contends:
 
The crucial fact about reading, then, is that the
 
reader is engaged at every moment in making a choice of
 
whether to inveist the energy required to have the actual
 
experience implied in the words, or merely to read the
 
directions for constructing an experience...if you want
 
readers to breathe Ufe into your writing so that they get
 
a powerful experience from it, then you must breathe
 
experience into your words as you write (317 and 322).
 
It is the writer's "job" to write in such a way that readers
 
wiU make that investment of energy to "breath life" into the
 
words on the page.
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"Breathing life" into words however sounds nearly as bullying
 
as "be yourself" or "be interesting." How does one breathe life
 
into words? Richard Hugo cautioned "against conimunication because
 
once language exists only to convey information, it is dying"
 
(11). How do we keep language from dying on the page? I think
 
Hugo starts to answer this question, when he advises "somehow you
 
must switch your allegiance from the triggering subject to the
 
worda" (12). We must become adept at knowing the impact of our
 
sentence structures and word choices on a reader. We must become
 
conscientious about what we are asking the reader to do, then
 
forget it during the writing process. We must practice so that
 
the form becomes part of who we are, so that we can write well
 
without thinking abpnt iti This is what Richard Lanham refers to
 
as "trained intuition" (114). At one point in The Triggering Town
 
Hugo stresses the importance of practice in training one's self to
 
write. He says "once a spectator said, after Jack Nicklaus had
 
chipped a shot in fi?om a sand trap, 'That's pretty lucky.'
 
Nicklaus is supposed to have replied, 'Right. But I notice the
 
more I practice, the luckier I get" (17). To train our intuition
 
about readers, we must practice, both through human interraction
 
and through writing. The writer's self must be trained in intui
 
tion. Establishing a good relationship with the reader is not a
 
matter of luck.
 
In a sense, what this discussion is aimed toward is the
 
importance of the writer's awareness of, and ability to write
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within, his or her "discourse community" (Fish "Interpreting").
 
Each rhetorical situation is embedded within the larger context of
 
a particular community. The college student writes papers for
 
college professors, instructors and students, who are reading
 
within the context of an academic setting. Fiction writers are
 
writing within a certain genre that dictates what they can write
 
and still be called fiction writers, and what fiction readers
 
expect. Poets must write within certain agreed upon parameters if
 
they still want to be considered poets by their readers.
 
But simple knowledge or understanding of the genre or
 
rhetorical situation is not enough for the writer to create voice.
 
Surely Susan Dodd is aware of her discourse community and is
 
probably very knowledgeable about her medium. If creating voice
 
is related to the writer's relationship with the reader and how
 
the writer creates the reader, what is that fine line that the
 
writer must cross with the reader, in order to enter the realm of
 
voice?
 
Most critics and readers will agree that the experience of
 
voice has something to do with accessibility. Somehow the writer
 
as a person is more present, more "there," more accessible for the
 
reader. However the idea of accessibility is just as vague and
 
abstract as the notion of voice.
 
The notion of accessibility reminds me of an incident in a
 
graduate fiction workshop at the University of Montana, in which
 
Barry Hann^ told a student that the story the student had written
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was boring. When the student asked how he might make it more
 
interesting, Hannah replied, "be more interesting yourself!" Be
 
sides being a bully, is Hannah also referring to the notion that
 
the writer must create an interesting, "voiced" self, in order to
 
be interesting and to have voice? Have we come full circle, back
 
to the writer's creation of the self?
 
The whole exploration of the nature of the writer's self and
 
who the writer conceives the reader to be, is an exploration of
 
context. It has to do with the often inchoate assumptions the
 
writer brings to his relationship with the reader, that may deter
 
mine the quality of that relationship. When we say we have
 
experienced voice in a written work, we are also commenting on
 
the quality of the relationship we feel with the writer. When we
 
experience voice in writing, we perceive an"other" with whom we
 
want to be related. The experience of voice however, belongs to
 
the reader, and there are assumptions which the reader also brings
 
to this relationship that may determine his ability to experience
 
voice. The question of context and intention in the reading
 
experience, is the focus of the next chapter, "The Reader
 
Reading/Writing."
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Chapter 3:
 
THE: READER READING/WRITING
 
We have determined that voice occurs within a dynamic inter
 
relationship between a wi?iter v Teader a language they share.
 
While Chapter 2 explored the role of the writer in generating
 
voice within the framework of this relationship, Chapter 3 will
 
question what the reader might contribute to the generation of
 
voice. Just as the context of the writing experience was an
 
important factor in exploring how a writer might generate voice,
 
the rhetorical context of the reading experience is also important
 
in exploring how a reader might contribute to the experience of
 
voice. A reader is influenced by a variety of factors: his or
 
her language system, literary competence, ego, and discourse com
 
munity will all help determine his or her experience of a text.
 
In his essay "The Rhetoric of Blindness," Paul de Man
 
explains that reading "is an act of understanding that can never
 
be observed, nor in any way prescribed or verified" ("Blindness"
 
107). Some critics such as Stanley Fish, argue that the writer
 
has Little to do with the reader's experience of a text, and in
 
fact the "influence" between the text and reader is more the
 
reverse of what we most commonly assume. Textual devices, or
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"formal units Fish writes;
 
are always a function of the interpretative model one
 
brings to bear; they are not 'in' the text, and I would
 
make the same argument for [the author'si intentions....
 
An intention.,.is made when perceptual or interpretive
 
closure is hazarded; it is verified by [the reader's]
 
interpretive act, and I would add, it is not verifiable in
 
any other way. ("Interpreting" 176)
 
As he States, the formal unit or "text" is always a function
 
of the reader's interpretation. The reader"influences" the text,
 
and not vice versa. Fish further argues agmnst the notion that
 
the text as an object at 8dl. lie states;
 
The great merit... of kinetic art is that it forces you
 
to be aware of"it" as a changing object— and therefore
 
no "object" at all -- and also to be aware of yourself as
 
correspondingly changing...In its operation it makes
 
inescapable the actualizing role of the observer,
 
literature is a kinetic art, but the physical form it
 
assumes prevents us from seeing its essential nature« even
 
though"re so experience it. (''literature" 83)
 
If the reading '^encounter" is so solitary in nature, relying
 
strictly on the consciousness of the one being (reader) andi:com
 
pletely non-obsenvable by any"other," what is it in reading that
 
allows us the experience of another to whom we attribute Jiice?
 
Could it be that in reading we are faced with an existen __
 
dilemma? We want to believe there is an other sneaking. an|d that
 
We are not alone with our experience. Richard Hugo's adTOce to
 
"glance over your shoulder, and you'll find there is no render"
 
can also apply to the 3?eader in his or her experience of th|i
 
writer. Perhaps when:we speak of voice, we are really reacting
 
to the possibility, in true Derridean fashion, that thera is|no
 
actual voice. As Fish explains, "there is more to [reading]| that
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is, to its experience, than meets the casual eye" ("Literature"
 
77). In the final analysis, any "observation" or discussion of
 
the reading process(w^hich "cannot be prescribed or verified") is
 
metaphysical. Texts do not speak. How is it that we hear them?
 
In his chapter "How to Get Power Through Voice," in Writing
 
With Power, Peter Elbow says a curious thing. He advises student
 
writers to "practice re"Wsing lor voice." He says, "this is
 
really an exercise in adjusting the breath in the words till it
 
guides the reader's voice naturally to each pause and full stop"
 
(emphasis mine 305). The phi^e, "reader's voice" almost slips by
 
unnoticed, but not quite. Elbow's book focuses on the writing
 
process, so what does he mean when he speaks of the reader's
 
voice? How does it differ firam the writer's voice? Or does it?
 
What are the elements in the context that the reader operates
 
within? How do these elements influence the reading experience?
 
Before we can address the problem of a reader's voice, we
 
must first ask, who is the reader? Earlier, when discussing the
 
writing process, we considered that perhaps the reader doesn't
 
exist for the wnriter es cept as an extension of the writer's own
 
consciousness. Who exactly are we thinking about when we say
 
"reader," and what dees this have to do with voice?
 
To begin with, there can be no voice without hearing just as
 
there can be no hearing without sound. Jacques Oerzida writes:
 
to speak to someone is doubtless to hear oneself speak,
 
to be heard b T oneself; but, at the same time, if one is
 
heard by anottier, to speak is to make him repeat
 
immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the
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very form in which I effectuated it. (Speech and Phenomena
 
80)
 
Likewise, when reading, the reader repeats "immediately in
 
himself the hearing-oneself-speak" as a t3rpe of listening. When
 
reading, the reader ci-eates an inner dialogue by first "speaking"
 
a fictitious, authorial presence (thus creating an inner authorial
 
voice), and in so doing, "hears" what is being spoken. A speak
 
ing/listening duo occurs at the moment a reader interracts with
 
written words. The r[•eader then, is the one who "processes" sound
 
into intelligibility. In turn, the reader "is to some extent
 
processed by the method that uses him as a control" (Fish
 
"Literature" 87). This "method" is nothing less than the ling
 
uistic and literary conventions which the writer and reader share.
 
Walker Gibson discusses the idea of the reader being
 
processed by the text, in his article "Authors, Speakers, Readers,
 
and Mock Readers." Gibson claims that, in the reading experience,
 
"we are recreated by 1;he language. We assume for the sake of
 
experience, that set of attitudes and qualities which the language
 
asks Us to assume" (265).
 
Similarly, George; Poulet writes that
 
reading, then is the act in which the subjective prin
 
ciple which I call I, is modified in such a way that I no
 
longer have the right, strictly speaking, to consider it
 
as my I.... Who, when I say I, is indeed that I? (57)
 
While this seems to be in direct contradiction with Fish's idea
 
that it is the reader who influences the text, and not vice versa,
 
the two notions can be reconciled if we look at the reading
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 experience as and exchange or interraction.
 
The reader brings many factors, both conscious and uncon
 
scious, to this "processing for inteiligLbtlity." The reader
 
makes meaning by engaging an understanding or mastery (in the
 
sense of dance and dancer being one) of "the phonological,
 
syntactic and semanti systems of his [or her] language" (Culler
 
101). Culler continues that this mastery
 
enables[tle reader] to convert the sounds into
 
discrete units to recognize words, and to assign a
 
structural description and interpretation to the resulting
 
sentence, ev€n though it be quite new to him. Without
 
this implicit inowledge, this internsilized grammar, the
 
sequence of sounds does hot speak to him. (101)
 
A reader is someone who has mastered the technique of a
 
particular language, someone who has mastered the language system.
 
The reader, in the sense that he or she embodies a particular
 
language system, is the "process" in "processing for
 
intelligibility". The static identity or ego is preempted by
 
process. As with writing, the act of reading is likewise, the act
 
of becoming.
 
The elements thsit come to bear on this process may differ
 
from one reader to the next (each individual is essentially a
 
unique process) in that each reader harbors a unique history.
 
Linguistic competence, literary competence, and individual history
 
will all act to comprise the nature of the pi^icess that the reader
 
becomes. These elemients all work to influence the reader's ex
 
pectations and projeclions for the text. Allen Harris explains
 
"we each listen with our own peculiar collection of strategies.
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biases and desires, our own bundle of motives, and we understand
 
only as a function of that immensely Gomplex bundle. One of the
 
implications of this situation is that we do not hear precisely
 
the same things" (172). Could this mean that some of us may hear
 
voice, while other readers will not?
 
Most often when we use the term voice with regard to written
 
material, it is in the GonteXt of evaluation or judgement. In
 
faot, it is impossible to speak of voioe out of experience and not
 
out of reflection of experience. Essentially, we Uve in
 
different worlds of experience, but rarely make the distinction.
 
Recently, I sat in on a seminar delivered by Werner Erhard, in
 
which Erhard discussad this very concept, using the game of tennis
 
to demonstrate his point. In the example, Erhard explained that
 
tennis resdly provides I the arena for two worlds of sport — that
 
of the player, and that of the spectator. No one would argue that
 
skill is not a major factor in any such competition, yet we never
 
question just where exactly that skill occurs. Is skill a
 
function of the tennis I player, or a function of the spectator? It
 
seems obvious that it is the player who posseses skill. He or she
 
is skillful. A problem arises however, when we ask the player to
 
show us his or her sl^. What we might get is a strong backhand
 
shotj or some quick foot work but the player will not be able to
 
show us skill. This ijs because skill is a function of the
 
spectator— it belongs in the stands, not on the court. The
 
moment a player focuses his or her attention on being skillful, he
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or she is no longer playing tennis — is no longer "in the game"
 
so to speak. The player is hoW "outside" play, judging and
 
evaluating his or her pwh actions. For anyone who has experienced
 
being a master tennis player, or dancer, or pianist, or even
 
writer, the experience while playing, dancing or writing, is that
 
of being absent from the task. It is the experience of becoming
 
(or being) the task. :Once our attention is focused away from the
 
task, we can no longeb be One with it. We have become spectators.
 
Skill does not exist "dut there" in the tennis player. It is
 
present only as a function of reflection, evaluation or specula
 
tion.
 
Similarly, when reading we have an experience. Should we
 
stop to reflect on that experience, we are no longer reading, we
 
are reflecting on reading. If I stop to ask about voice in a
 
poem, I am no longer in the experience of the poem. I am "in the
 
stands" so to speak. Most often, the writing to which we attri
 
bute voice, is that which we are able to lose ourselves in — we
 
become the experience as opposed to the reflection of the
 
experience. When in the experience, the "I" that I Consider
 
myself to be, ceases to exist. When the dancer and the dance
 
become one, the dancer ceases to exist as such. To speak of voice
 
is really to speak of the experience of spectatorship, not the
 
■i . • ; ■ . ' . ■ ■ 
experience of reading; The devices each of us bring to the 
reading experience will determine the nature of our "spectator-
ship." As members of particular discourse communities each of us 
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will come loaded with our own "bundle" of expectations and pur
 
poses that will lead us to determine whether or not voice has been
 
achieved. I
 
The phenomenology of how understanding (which is a recursive,
 
reflective act) can possibly occur in the reading process — in
 
the interraction between words (signs), phenomeneil presence (sig
 
nified) and consciousness, is mind boggling, even in its most
 
simplified form.
 
Consider the following example. The first stanza of Richard
 
Hugo's poem"The Lady in Kicking Horse Reservoir" reads:
 
Not my hands but green across you now.
 
Green tons hold you down, and ten bass curve
 
teasing in your hair. Summer sUme
 
will pile deep on your breast. Four months of ice
 
will keep you firm. I hope each spring
 
to find you tangled in those pads
 
pulled not quite loose by the spillway pour,
 
stars in dead Reflection off your teeth.
 
On the surface, it seems that each word directs us as to what
 
we should conceptualize. Each sign represents an image or a
 
relationship to other images, which we are to visualize as we
 
pronounce (or read) the words. A reader considers each sign in
 
relation to the other signs in order to create a new image. This
 
concept seems simple enough. However, if we consider the word
 
"green," this simplicity gasps. Hugo writes "not my hands but
 
green across you now/Green tons hold you down." Somehow we know
 
that Hugo means something different with each instance of green.
 
The first is taken as an adjective/verb, and the second is clearly
 
an adjective. Signification as a logical phenomenon breaks down
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in this instance. The;same word "green" means several different
 
things in the context of the first two lines. With the first
 
"green" I see the color green, and I see sweeping motion
 
(actually, I see a hand sweeping across an inner, visual screen).
 
With the first green, the reader makes the illogical substitution
 
of "sweep" for "greenj" Hugo could have written "not my hands but
 
sweep across you npw^" but the sound and the connotative value of
 
the verb Would alter the line's effect on a reader. "Green
 
across" is much more eerie than "sweep across."
 
Part of this effect can be accounted for by the fact that
 
''green'' ends with a soft (what is often referred to in creative
 
writing circles as femimne)sound, whereas "sweep" ends on a
 
much stronger note. In the context of the line and the vision
 
Hugo intends, "green" is a much more appropriate verb, even though
 
it is used incorrectly as a verb. "Not ray hands but green across
 
you now," gives me chills. "Not my hands but sweep across you
 
now," and I say "interesting, what's next?" How can we account
 
for this difference in effect, strictly on the basis of sound?
 
Ip his article ''Deconstructibh and Linguistic Analysis,"
 
Ronald Schleifer explains that isolating one term, such as I have
 
done with "green" is misleading, and that we must consider a word
 
in the context of its sentence. He says, "to consider a term as
 
simply the union of a certain sound with a certain concept... is
 
grossly misleading. To define it in this way would isolate the
 
term from its system" (383). But it seems in this instance, the
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system breaks down, or else it is more complex and perhaps more
 
imbedded in subconsciousness than our first assumptions allow.
 
Why does the word "^een," in its use as a yerb, have the effect
 
on me that could not be created had Hugo used the word "sweep?"
 
How can we account for this overall change in effect due to the
 
minute change (or exchange) of one word for another, within a
 
system? Meaning, and hence the whole system, appears to be
 
changed by this one Substitution.
 
In essence, the system is changed with each individual
 
reader's "processing.'! The problem with the above analysis is
 
that it is my analysisV As Hugo's reader I share a linguistic (we
 
both have mastered English), literary (we both understand and
 
embody an individual level of competence with poetic form) and
 
even personal history;with Hugo that cannot be duplicated by any
 
of his other readers. ; My processing for intelligibility has a
 
quantity (as far as shared "systems" and history with the writer)
 
and quality that is urliqUe. Richard Hugo's writing has a
 
tremendous "voice/' but only to the degree that that voice can be
 
experienced as such by the process that his reader becomes. The
 
voice we hear in Hugo's poetry is in essence, a construct of
 
shared "knowledge" bietween Hugo and his reader.
 
Jonathan Culler refers to an aspect of such shared knowledge
 
as "convention" in his essay "Literary Competence." He claims:
 
The work has structure and meaning because it is read
 
in a particular way...potential properties ...are
 
actualized by the theory of discourse applied in the act
 
of reading. (102)
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He demonstrates the importanee of such conventions by
 
suggesting we consider a, common line of prose from a newspaper or
 
novel, and set it down on a page in a poetic form. The linguistic
 
qualities of the line will remain unchanged but
 
the different meanings which the text acquires can
 
not... be attributed to one's knowledge of the language
 
but must be ascribed to the special conventions for
 
reading poetry which lead one to look at the language in
 
new ways... tp subject the text to a different series of
 
interpretive operations. (103)
 
Convention itself functions as a sign for a competent or
 
"informed" (as Fish refers to it) reader. The notion of
 
convention suggests a communal or public signification -- some
 
thing that is understood in the same way, by each individusil
 
member of a discourse community. When convention is not an aspect
 
of the reading processi, writing is perceived as lifeless or non
 
sensical.
 
For example, several years ago my father asked to see a book
 
of poems I was reading. He read several poems then handed the
 
book back to me without comment. T considered these to be
 
extraordinary poems (David Wojahn's Icehouse Lights), and didn't
 
see how my father couldn't share my feelings. The poems did not
 
"Speak" to him in the same way that they "speak" to me. He did
 
not share the conventions of reading poetry so the poems seemed
 
simplistic and inane to him. He could not "hear" them in the seime
 
way that someone versCd in literary conventions might hear them.
 
I then read some of the poems out Ibud to him, after which he
 
said, "Oh, I get it. That's nice." Somehow, he had been unable
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to provide the "voice"! when he read the poems to himself. When I
 
provided that "voice" by reading the poems out loud, the poems
 
took oh new dimmensions.
 
There are several factors then, that we must consider in
 
determining how a reader might create or hear voice in a text.
 
The first has to do with the text itself, and the rhetorical
 
forces brought to bear upon the reader by the writer. If the
 
writer somehow requires the reader to become someone he does not
 
wish to bej the reader will probably not even finish reading the
 
text, let alone perceive the quality called voice. Walker Gibson
 
writes, "A bad book, then, is a book in whose mock reader we
 
discover a person we refuse to become, a rnask we refuse to put on,
 
a role we will not play" (268). The text must be written in such
 
a way that the reader allows himself to become the "mock reader,"
 
and establish a relationship with who he perceives the writer to
 
be..- ­
A second factor in whether or not a reader hears voice has to
 
do with the reader's purpose for reading and the reader's expecta
 
tions of the text. Is the reader looking for, or"listening" for,
 
voice? This will be determined by the reader's identity as a
 
member of a particular discourse community.
 
Voice is a sOphisticiated notion. A reader of Hemingway, for
 
instance, will not consider Hemingway's voice if that reader is
 
not versed in literary terminology. Voice is an element of
 
"practitioner lore," which is"The accumulated body of traditions.
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practices, and beliefs jin terms of which practitioners understand
 
how writing is done, Ijearned, and taught" (North 22). When we use
 
the term voice with rejgard to writing, we are identifying our­
■ . . ' , ■ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ ' ■ . , 
selves as members of the literary community. We distinguish
 
ourselves as "insiders" (Kermode). According to Frank Kermode,
 
"to divine the true, the latent sense, you need to be of the
 
elect, of the institution" (3), and later, "there is seeing and
 
hearing, which are what naive listeners and readers do; and there
 
is perceiving and understanding, which are in principle reserved
 
to an elect..." (3).
 
Being an "insider" (for Kermode) is not simply a matter of
 
being more knowledgeable about literature and reading than the
 
"outsider"; it is about acquiring particular sensitivities to the
 
reading experience. One such "sensitivity" is for what we call
 
voice.
 
Because voice refers to an experience and not necessarily to
 
a verifiable fact, voice belongs in the domain of readerhood.
 
Each reader's complex "bundle" of motives and desi^s will contri
 
bute or detract from the experience we call voice. Both the
 
reader and writer are essentially created by the linguistic exper
 
ience — each is a "process of becoming" in the reading/writing
 
interaction. In the following chapter, we will explore language
 
as the context in which this interaction develops.
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Chapter 4:
 
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LANGUAGE:
 
A DECONSTRUCTION OF VOICE
 
The relationship that the reader and writer share, and which
 
seems to actually create, to a certain extent, the identity of
 
each within that relationship, is based in language. So while the
 
assumptions and beliefs that the writer and reader each bring to
 
the writing/reading experience determine the effect of that
 
experience on each individual, the entire relationship takes place
 
within a much larger context: language. The noted psychiatrist
 
and philosopher Jacques Lacan argues that our experience of all
 
reality is predicated within language. The influence of language
 
effects and the mastery of convention is what voice is all about.
 
It is also what rhetoric is all about. In his preface to
 
Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, Newton Garver states "rhetoric is
 
thus not a natter of pure form but has to do with the relation of
 
language to the world (to life) through the relation of linguistic
 
expressions to the specific circumstances in which their use makes
 
sense" (x). Similarly, Marshall Alcorn argues in "Rhetoric,
 
Projection, and the Authority of the Signifier":
 
Texts are not purely the product of a reader's projec
 
tion. Texts have particular properties of their own.
 
These particular properties, however, do not exist as
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categories of referential meaning; they exist as something
 
we might call rhetoric... [we are encoui*aged] to hypothe
 
size a relation between the projective forces brought to
 
bear upon the!text by the reader and the rhetorical forces
 
brought to bear upon the reader by the text... when we
 
encounter rhetoric in texts, we encounter the forces at
 
tached to words that generate, employ, or "bind" emotion.
 
(147-48)
 
Alcorn is describing a type of reader-text exchange in which
 
both the reader and the text are altered or at least perceived as
 
altered. i
 
During the process of this exchange, communication happens.
 
Voice seems to be an aspect of written communication that eUcits
 
an emotional response^ In what way is this emotional response
 
related to litered meaning? In writing and reading we may seek
 
understanding on an intellectual level, but to what extent is
 
meaning altered by our emotional experience?
 
A primary difference between many critics lies, not only in
 
the questions that they ask of literature, but in where they
 
attribute the source of meaning. It is not only a question of
 
which possible meaning is the most important or true, but of where
 
that meaning is generated. Getting back to the distinction
 
"green/ sweep," the literal meaning of the phrase does not change.
 
Numerous words coiild be substituted for green, without changing
 
the literal meaning Of the sentence -- "my hands don't sweep
 
across you now" (or 'i'my hands aren't across you now, but green
 
■ is"). ■ 
The question is, is literal meaning the sole function of
 
langua^? If it is, then any discussion about quality or Voice is
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simply inane. Let computers do the writing from now on, and
 
banish all composition i courses. Literal meaning is apparently
 
fairly simple, unless ^ e include feeling as an aspect of meaning.
 
Feeling is an importaii|t aspect of language effects. It is the
 
difference between "getting the chills" from green, and the "ho­
hums" from sweep. In Derrida's words "where does this complicity
 
between sound and ideality^ or rather, between voice and ideality,
 
come from" ("Speech" 77)? He is referring to the immediacy of
 
experience with words. At the moment of cognition, the word fades
 
into the experience that it represents, or means. As Derrida
 
explains,
 
this immediate presence results from the fact that the
 
phenomenological 'body' of the si^iifier seems to fade
 
away at the very moment it is produced... this effacement
 
of the sensible body and its exteriority is for conscious
 
ness the very form of the immediate presence of the signi
 
fied" ("Speech 77).
 
There is a dynamic relationship here between objects (words)
 
and consciousness (meaning/feeling). Somehow the objects are
 
imbued by consciousness and, in the same instant, alter that
 
consciousness. Alcorn addresses this dynamic encounter by
 
• writingt'
 
words matter in their particular material signifying
 
substance— bpth as marks and as sounds.... If it is
 
clear that the material presence of words matters
 
enormously to the functions of the self, and especially to
 
the unconscious functions of the self, then it should also
 
be clear that critical theory needs to examine how
 
projective activities are animated by the signifier's
 
materiality. If texts are not blarik screens for
 
projections, if instead projections are somehow "filtered"
 
and networked by a text's signifiers, then we must find
 
effective terins to describe this process... projective
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processes of reading are modified by textual encounters.
 
■ 
Jacques Derrida closely examines this relationship in Of
 
Grammatologv. What he really examines is our relationship to or
 
with language. The qluestion of voice revolves not only around the
 
relationship between the reader and the writer, but can be more
 
precisely examined by studying the relationship of each to
 
language. What is language, and how does our concept of language
 
determine what we are able to perceive or "hear"? What are the
 
conventions of language that influence or limit the questions we
 
ask of language—- that determine our experience of language?
 
There are numereus approaches we could take in exploring this
 
question, but the theories of Jacques Lacan are particularly
 
evocative. In her essay on voice, Susan Dodd writes, "Freud noted
 
that 'writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person'"
 
(80), Lacan tSkes the ball of absence (so to speak), and runs
 
with it. For Lacan, language itself is evoked from a primal sense
 
of absence. IhsteSd of thinking of language eis representative of
 
existential phenomena, language is in fact evocative (a word which
 
is interestingly enough, derived from the latinate root^"
 
which means voice) with regard to such phenomena.
 
For each individual, language begins early in life in what
 
Lacan refers to as the mirror stage (stade du miroir). As Anthony
 
Wilden explains.
 
The "mirror phase" derives its name from the importance
 
of mirror relationships in childhood. The significance of
 
children's attempts to appropriate or control their own
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image in a mix^ror is that their actions are symptomatic of
 
these deeper relationships. Through his perception of the
 
image of another human being, the child discovers a form
 
(Gestalt), a corporeal unity... (160)
 
Essentially, by discovering such a "corporeal unity," which
 
the child identifies as a self, the child also recognizes the
 
distinction between that self and that which is other than self.
 
It recognizes within itself the absence of the "other," who is
 
usually the mother. Wilden further explsdns that
 
Lacan would view the newborn child as an "absolute
 
subject" in a totally intransitive relationship to the
 
world he cannot yet distinguish from himself. For the
 
object to lae discovered by the child it must be
 
absent....since identification is itself dependent upon
 
the discovery:of difference, itself a kind of
 
absense....[For] Lacan, the "lack of object" is the gap in
 
the signifying chain which the subject seeks to fill at
 
the level of the signifier. (163-64)
 
According to Lacan, language springs from our need for a sort
 
of reunification with 'rotheri" We use the signifier, or word, to
 
"call forth" the otheri ahd hopefully, the other's desire.
 
If we take Lacan's theory as actusility, and we all experience
 
a primal need for harmony or reuhification with an "other," it is
 
easy to see how we might create such an other in the
 
reading/writing experience, which is solely linguistic. Language
 
is evoked out of what Lacan terms the desire for the desire of
 
another. All writing is done in language. Hence, writing and
 
reading (one cannot exist without the other) are likewise the
 
result of our desire for the desire of another. It would seem
 
that we indeed are reacting to an existential dilenuna when we talk
 
about voice in writing. We really do want to believe there is
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another speaking and jthat we are not alone in our experience.
 
Lacan's conceptipn of language seems to be in direct
 
conflict with that posited by Plato some two thousand years ago.
 
Plato's conception of reahty is based upon an ideal exteriority,
 
and what we call reality is a mere shadow of that ideal existence.
 
For Plato, this ideal 1 is what we refer to when we speak. It is
 
that which our spoken words signify, but which we can never at
 
tain. Rise Axelrod addressed this in her discussion of voice at
 
the 1986 CCCC, when she stated that "we associate voice with the
 
truth of mind and thing, an association that goes back to Plato.
 
The logocentt'ic tradition of Greco^Ghristian onto-theOlogy valor
 
izes voice and gives it its power" (16). In this logocentric
 
traditioni writihg is represehtatiye of spoken language, (which in
 
turn is symbolic of the ideal "signified"), so writing of the
 
highest qufiility will be that which most resembles the spoken word.
 
It wiU be that which we most easily ''hear," as if a living voice
 
is speaking it.
 
Such subbrdinatfbn of wtdting to the spoken word has its
 
roots buried deep within the history, even genesis, of human
 
logic. Our quest for voice in writing may be nothing more than
 
logocentric tendencies so deeply embedded in our conception of
 
reality that we are no longer even conscious of them. It is more
 
correctly stated that bur conception of reality is imbedded
 
within our logocentricity.
 
Derrida writes, jthat in a logocentric reality.
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The writteri signifier is always technical and repre
 
sentative. It has no constitutive meaning... The notion
 
of the sign always implies within itself the distinction
 
between signifier and signified... this notion remains
 
therefore within the heritage of...[the] absolute proximi
 
ty of voice and being, of voice and meaning of being, of
 
voice and the 'ideality of meaning. (11-12)
 
Written words are one step removed from spoken words. Spoken
 
words have a direct relationship with our own state of being,
 
consciousness and mea,ning of consciousness. This thinking can be
 
traced to Aristotle. Derrida writes, "if^ for Aristotle, for
 
example, 'spoken words (ta en te phone) are the symbols of mental
 
experience (pathematai tes psyches) and written words are the
 
s3nnbols of spoken wohds' interpretation, 1, 16a 3) it is
 
because the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relation
 
ship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind" (11).
 
The quest for voice in writing is a quest for that direct link
 
with consciousness, i
 
But Such thinking is faulty. We are looking for voice as a
 
derivative of language. But our conception of language, particu
 
larly written languajgej as something that we create as a tool or
 
symbol, is the antithesis of what we actually experience when we
 
experience voice in waiting.
 
We think of lan^age as functioning from within (mind), then
 
through external channels (speech/air or writing/ink), to be
 
processed or understood by the within (mind) of an other. But
 
this notion totedly excludes the relationship of that "within"
 
with what we call external reality. Perhaps the "fault" (if we
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can call it such) origihates in our use of the metaphor voice. By
 
using this metaphor, vie essentially equate spoken word with writ
 
ten, robbing the written of its distinct qualities, when in fact
 
what we mean to equate is spoken words with the effect of written.
 
Sometimes we experience having been "spoken" to when we read, as
 
if we actually heard the words pronounced by another. But what if
 
this effect is actually quite distinct from that which we
 
experience with spoken words? Derrida writes that metaphor in
 
general is "the passagb from one existent to another" ("Writing"
 
27). What is the other existent that we refer to when we speak of
 
"voice" in written material? By analogy, let us say that spoken
 
words are the equivalent of ydnd and written words are the move-^
 
ment of the leaves of the trees. The movement of leaves does not
 
represent wind unless we say it does. The movement of leaves is
 
the moyement of leaves. We say this movement is the same as
 
wind, when in fact it is spmething altogether distinct from wind.
 
Consider also the written transcript of a conversation. Such
 
a transcript rarely cohveys "presence" such as we speak of when we
 
speak of voice. Often transcribed conversations are confusing and
 
dull and require special interpretive allowances in order to
 
understand them. They do not follow the conventions that are
 
unique to written discourse. Likewise, writing a dialogue is
 
often considered one of the most difficult tasks for the fiction
 
writer, who needs to make a conversation seem real while still
 
employing the conventions of writing. These examples alone indi­
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cate there is a property in writing that is not a consideration
 
when we speak. i
 
It's interesting tp note that we do not use voice as a quali
 
tative judgement with regard to spoken language. Of a great orator
 
we do not say that hp or she speaks with voice. Such a statement
 
seems absurd. Martin Luther King did not speak with voice as,
 
say, Coleridge wrote with voice. Instead we say King was the
 
voice of the oppressed. Speakers are articulate or powerful or
 
energetic, but they do not have voice. Voice in writing is not
 
voice in oratory, and in fact what we call voice in Writing may be
 
impossible to duplicate in speech. 1 tried to think of speakers
 
who struck me as Unipue or powerful, and then asked whether 1
 
could equate my feeling of listening to them with the feeling 1
 
have when 1 read writing that has voice. Pa3?ticular teachers came
 
to mind, even famous:speakers like Ghandi or John Kennedy^ They
 
were all articulate, ahd there Was a sense of them being fully con
 
scious or present as they speak. Somehow they were able to remain
 
individual, to retain unique personalities while spesddng before
 
crowds of people. 1 can see similarities in listening to these
 
speakers and reading writers who "have found their voice." How
 
ever, if a reader responds to my writing by saying that I am
 
articulate, even powerful, he is sa3ring something different than
 
if he says I have voice, or 1 have found my voice. What is the
 
quality that these great spe£dcers have in common with writers who
 
have voice?
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The equation of wpiting with speech or subordination of
 
writing to speech, such logocentricity, is what Derrida calls an
 
"ethnocentric metaphysics" (Of Grammatology 79), that is unique to
 
Western culture. Chinese characters, for example, are not
 
phonetically oriented and cahriot thus be linked directly with
 
speech. Chinese writing is symbolic and distinct from speech.
 
Similarly, mathematics is a non-spoken language. Derrida quotes
 
the historian Feyrier as writing "[mathematics] is a sort of
 
universal language,i. it is writing, so badly misunderstood, that
 
takes the place of lan^age, after having been its servant" ("Of
 
Gram" 83). Gary Zukav discusses the problem of operating within
 
two distinct language systems when he writes about Einstein's
 
difficulties expressing linquistieally what he had written, or
 
come to understahd, mathematically. Zukav explains, that Einstein
 
had to make a "translation from one language to another. The
 
original language is in^thematics and the second language is
 
English. The problem is that there is simply no way of precisely
 
expressing what the first language says in terms of the second
 
language" (150) The problem with such translation is that English
 
is phonetically based, while mathematics is symbolic or conceptual
 
in nature, and distinct from any spoken language. As such, math
 
ematics is, to a certsdn degree, also distinct from spoken/heard
 
thought. The truly interesting question is, is it possible to
 
mathematically write with "voice?" If writing is truly distinct
 
from speech, and "voice" is an exclusive quality in writing, then
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it would seem plausible to have a corollary quality for voice in
 
mathematics. If so, we have misnamed that quality "voice," and
 
must create or more properly re-name a new term to distinguish
 
that quality.
 
Let us say for a moment that the answer is yes, there is
 
"voice" in mathematical language. The difficulty with this is
 
that we cannot conceptualize a reality in which voice is not the
 
approximation or signification of being. There is no "being" who
 
speaks mathematics, so we cannot conceive of mathematical writing
 
as having "voice." Mathematics represents "things" or concepts,
 
not "being." Voice is in direct correlation to being, we think.
 
I asked a friend. Who is a mathematician, what he thought. He
 
said there are mathematical theorums that carry a certain power
 
over other theorems. They have greater quality. This sense of
 
quality usually applies to those theorems which can be applied
 
globally or more generally, and not just to a particular circum
 
stance. Mathematicians do not, however, refer to such theorems
 
as having voice.
 
There is other language that is strictly written. The new
 
international pictoral signs that adorn the streets of most cities
 
are a sort of writing without words. In most countries now, one
 
crosses the street after a green, walking figurine appears on the
 
traffic light. But is this a written language?
 
Mathematics is not a pure language. Mathematicians rarely
 
write exclusively in mathematical terms. They use their spoken,
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native languages for ahalytic commentary and explanation.
 
It appears that when we speak of voice in writing, we are
 
speaking of a quality that is unique to phonetic writing. Derrida
 
writes "phonetic writing, however abstract and arbitrary, retained
 
some relationship vdth the presence of the represented voice, to
 
its possible presence in. general and therefore to that of a cer
 
tain passion" (Of Grammatplbgy 312). A "certain passion" is that
 
for which we use the imetaphor voice.
 
Voice, Uke skill, is what Robert Pirsig might call a modem
 
ghost. He writes.
 
Within that context of thought, ghosts and spirits are
 
quite as real ks atoms, particles, photons and quanta are
 
to modern man ... what I'm driving at... is the notion
 
that before the beginning of the earth, before the sun and
 
the stars were formed} before the primal generation of
 
anything, not in anyone's mind because there wasn't any
 
one, this law of gravity existed?...the law of gravity and
 
gravity itself did hot exist before Isaac Newton... and
 
what that means is that the law of gravity exists nowhere
 
except in people's heads! It's a ghost! (32-33)
 
As such, the donning of voice, is essentially the creation of
 
voice. Our relationship with reality is hot what we pretend it to
 
be. We essentially create our reality through language. Period.
 
Speaking becomes a metaplior for creating. To speak of voice, is
 
to speek in language.' To speak it is to create it. We speak
 
"chair" whenever we sit on a construction of wood or aluminum that
 
has a flat, horizontal surface and three or four legs to hold our
 
weight. Gary Zukav quotes Albert Einstein as having written "phy-^
 
sical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not,
 
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world" (8),
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The fact that voice is a mental creation does not, however,
 
make it less real. Voice is no less real than quality or skill.
 
To langtiage "voice" is to inhabit the world of m5rthos. We want
 
to discuss the experience of voice, not the concept. Gary Zukav
 
writes that "the difference between experience and s5mibol is the
 
difference between mjdihos and logos" (261).
 
M3rthos seems to be anything that does not easily sit within
 
the realm of logical, systematic thought. Our own logocentricity
 
includes reasoning that sees the world as a system. All reality
 
operates within the system of logic and in order to understand
 
that which does not yet make sense, we need to find the missing
 
"hnk" in the chain of logic. It is such logic that sees language
 
as representative of reality, speech as a representation of
 
language and writing as a representation of speech. The chain is
 
complete. Such a view of communication makes sense. The only
 
major problem with this is that the world, and experience in
 
particular, does not operate according to our own systematic
 
ordering. Zukav addresses this problem when he writes,
 
Logos imitates, but can never replace, experience. It 
is a substitute for experience. Logos is the artificial 
construction of...S3nnbols which mimics experience on a 
one-to-one basis... Mythos points toward experience, but 
it does not replace experience... a language of mythos... 
is the true language of physics. This is because... 
language...[and] also mathematics, follows a certain set 
of rules (ck^sical logic). Experience itself is not 
bound by these rules♦. .[mythos] is based not upon the way
that we think of things, but upon the way that we ex 
perience them. (282-63) 
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To try and operate exclusively within either mythos or logos
 
would be nothing short of suicide, or insanity. It is important
 
to acknowledge how the two thinking processes conjoin. Neither is
 
superior to the other. Robert Pirsig writes that logos "refers to
 
the sum total of our rational understanding of the world," while
 
mythos "is the sum total of the early historic and prehistoric
 
mjdihs which preceded the logos" (343). As such, logocentric
 
thought cannot help but be influenced by mythlogic thought. Our
 
logocentricity in turn, creates a new mythology — it creates new
 
ghosts, such as voice.
 
An aspect of our new mjrthology that is easily traced to
 
logical thought, is the notion that we create language, and
 
language is a tool for communication when in fact we are in part,
 
if not en toto, created by language. "In the beginning was the
 
tVORD." At first glance, this statement seems easy to refute. It
 
is in fact more complicated than we first assume. Robert Pattison
 
quotes Helen Keller as writing:
 
Before my teabher came to me, I did not know that I am.
 
I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to
 
describe adeqluately that unconscious yet conscious time of
 
nothingness. I did not know that I knew aught, or that I
 
lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor intel
 
lect.... Since I had no power of thought, I did not com
 
pare one mental state with another. So I was not con
 
scious of any change or process going on in my brain when
 
my teacher began to instruct me... when I learned the
 
meaning of "I" and "me" and found that I was something, I
 
began to think. Then consciousness first existed for me.
 
(11)
 
In fact Helen Keller did not exist for herself until she
 
acquired, or (more accurately stated) was created by language.
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She may have existed; for others, but these others already
 
possessed language capabiUties. How can an exterior exist with
 
out an interior? Nothing, including herself, existed for Helen
 
Keller until language existed/created. As Pattison writes, "to be
 
conscious of oneself a;s a user of language... is to begin to take
 
the measure of creatidn" (12). Similarly, Julian Jajmes writes
 
that "consciousness [hence, self], is the invention of an analog
 
world on the basis of;language... consciousness comes after
 
language!" (66)
 
We know that a system does not exist until we construct it.
 
Aristotle's "method" of rhetoric is likewise a constructed system
 
-- a kind of map which we can use to produce the effects that we
 
want. The problem with our use of rhetoric is that we've for
 
gotten it was intended as a map. Rise Axelrod explained that "our
 
way of understanding the world is an ideology which pretends to
 
itself that it is not an ideology at all" (16). But what is this
 
ideology? Where does the map of rhetoric lead us? This map
 
directs us toward something. What is that something? What is the
 
essence of rhetoric?
 
William Stafford once wrote, "one who composes in
 
language moves in the presence of sound... breathes with a set of
 
muscles that will clutter or enhance the ever-varying physical
 
presence of language effects" (55). This chapter began with a
 
quote from Marshall Alcorn regarding "the forces attached to
 
words that generate, employ, or 'bind' emotion," There seems to
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be a dynamiq interraction between language forces and language ef
 
fects. The writer tries to somebow harness the creative forces of
 
language, while the reader is engaged in an exchange with the
 
"ever varying physical presence of language effects." This force
 
which we attribute to;language, and the effect we receive from
 
language, are as close as we can get to the notion of voice.
 
Voice is a qualitative measure of language force and language
 
effect. What the map of rhetoric ideally leads to, is voice.
 
Commonly rhetoric is viewed as a method, as form, as logos. Form
 
has dominated substance, logos over mythos. Rhetoric is the
 
logos, voice is the mjHhos.
 
Interestingly enough, if we go back and take a look at the
 
model of our circumscription for voice, it could easily substitute
 
as a circumscription for rhetoric in its ideal form. Both occur
 
only within the contekt of a human relationship that is deeply
 
imbedded in language!. James Kinneavy in his Theory of Discourse,
 
explores in great detml such a model of rhetoric. For Kinneavy,
 
such a model is the foundation for discourse theory. Such a model
 
may also be key to our gaining insight into a theory of voice.
 
When the first rhetoricians were laying out their methods,
 
they had an ideal in mind. The purpose of their method was to
 
attain this ideal. This ideal might be defined as new conscious
 
ness for a listener or reader. The experience of voice, is the
 
experience of donning new awareness or consciousness, if only for
 
a very short time, created out of a quality presence of language
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